First half of the article
IT was refreshing to see Dr Zacch Adedeji, Chairman of the Nigeria Revenue Service, on Seun Okinbaloye’s Politics Today on Channels Television last week. Few senior Nigerian public officials appear to explain government’s stewardship. I intend to sustain that engagement by examining his remarkable proposition: “If balance sheet of Nigeria is getting better, by extension life of Nigerians are getting better.”He reasoned that Nigerians collectively constitute Nigeria. But aggregation is not distribution.
Consider his four questions: What did we meet? What have we done? What are the results? How does the future look?
What did we meet?
Adedeji identified four “mutually reinforcing distortions” Tinubu’s administration met: an unsustainable subsidy regime; an opaque foreign-exchange market; an underperforming oil sector; and a tax base he considered too small for the economy. The diagnosis has merit. But the patient’s condition must determine the sequence of treatment. Nigeria entered these reforms with widespread poverty, low wages, unreliable electricity, weak public transportation, import dependence and limited social protection—all limiting how much economic shock households could absorb.
What did we do?
The Tinubu administration removed petrol subsidy, unified the foreign-exchange markets, pursued tax reforms and issued executive measures on crude production and revenue collection. These addressed genuine distortions. Tax reform was overdue. But credibility and transparency remain concerns. Last week, Nairametrics reported that although “tax reforms promised relief, evidence shows multiple levies are killing businesses.”
The deeper question is sequencing. Removing petrol subsidy while allowing the naira to depreciate transmitted higher costs through transportation, food, self-generated electricity and imported goods. Adedeji argued that “economics is not run by emotion.” But economics is not the whole of statecraft. Indeed, South Africa reduced its fuel levy in 2026 to cushion households, foregoing an estimated R17.2 billion in tax revenue. India retains targeted subsidies for domestic cooking gas. Fiscal cost is not the only cost a state must calculate. Social consequences matter too. Adedeji’s own comparators understand that. So do countries that sustain costly programmes such as Britain’s NHS and America’s Medicaid because their value isn’t measured by fiscal cost alone.
Economics asks whether a policy is sustainable. Statecraft asks whether people can survive the transition. Recognising that petrol subsidy—or discount—was unsustainable did not preclude reforming the regime or providing social buffers, particularly alongside a major FX adjustment. That is the distinction between accounting and statecraft.
Òrìṣà, bí o bálègbé mi, ṣemíbí o ṣebá mi—if you cannot improve my condition, leave me as you found me. Reform should remove distortions, not make the poor its shock absorbers. Sequencing also requires production. A country allowing its currency to float while remaining import-dependent must make domestic productive capacity an economic emergency. Government should identify imports Nigeria can replace, remove infrastructure constraints and provide industrial finance. When ministries and agencies purchase imported vehicles where Nigerian alternatives exist, government consumes scarce foreign exchange while exporting industrial demand. Exchange-rate reform changes the price of foreign currency. Industrial policy changes how desperately your economy needs it.
What are the results?
Adedeji’s charts showed tax revenue rising from ₦12.3 trillion to ₦28.3 trillion; capital importation from $3.9 billion to $23.22 billion; solid-minerals revenue from ₦16 billion to ₦70 billion; NGX market capitalisation from ₦30.36 trillion to ₦161 trillion; and the minimum wage from ₦30,000 to ₦70,000. He also said stock-market gains created over 900 millionaires. The World Bank acknowledges Nigeria’s progress in macroeconomic stabilisation. But the same World Bank says household incomes have “yet to recover fully” and poverty remains high. It estimates that 63 per cent of Nigerians lived below the national poverty line in 2025, up from 61 per cent in 2024, with seven million falling into poverty. This complicates Adedeji’s proposition that a healthier national balance sheet means healthier household lives. For poor households, food can consume up to 70 per cent of income.
The Nigerian state has a balance sheet. So does every household. Lower inflation means prices are rising more slowly;it does not restore purchasing power. A worker receiving ₦70,000 does not automatically have greater purchasing power than one receiving ₦30,000 before living costs rose sharply.
Is Nigerian petrol…
Continue reading the complete column on the publisher’s website.
Read full article on Nigerian Tribune